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NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW INTESTATE
SUCCESSION ACT*
I
ITS HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY
FRxoERiCK B. McCALLt
At long last the General Assembly of North Carolina has acted to
free the state from the shackles of its ancient, outmoded, obsolescent,
and, in many cases, eminently unfair laws governing the descent and
distribution of the property of a person who dies intestate. An entirely
new Intestate Succession Act became effective on July 1, 1960-appli-
cable, however, only to estates of persons dying on or after that date.
As a result of this legislation the devolution of a decedent's property will
be governed by a plan that is modern and up to date in every respect,
and, it is hoped, more consonant with his desires had he made a will.
The crying need for a new intestate succession law becomes more
apparent when one realizes that, with but slight modification in the law,
the descent of real property to the heirs of a deceased person was de-
termined by canons of descent1 enacted in 1808; and that our separate
statute governing the distribution of personal property, with some legis-
lative changes made from time to time, bore a striking resemblance to
its English prototype-the Statute of Distributions,2 enacted in 1670.
In addition, North Carolina was one of the few remaining states in this
country which retained the old marital'life estates of dower and curtesy
as the share of the surviving spouse in the decedent spouse's estate.
These estates were a part of our common law inheritance from England
which abolished them in 19253
Perhaps it will be of some interest to recount, briefly, the history of
the struggle to bring about the revision and modernization of North
Carolina's intestate succession laws. Twenty-six years ago changes in
these laws were first advocated by the present writer and Mr. Allen
Langston in an article, published in the North Carolina Law Review,,
entitled "A New Intestate Succession Statute for North Carolina." 4
* This article consists of three papers presented at the Fall, 1960, Institute on
The New Intestate Succession Act, sponsored by the North Carolina Bar Associa-
tion. The editors of the Review wish to express their appreciation to the Bar Asso-
ciation for its authorization to publish these papers.
-Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina.
N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 4.
- 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10.8 Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23.
'11 N.C.L. Rav. 266 (1933).
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In that article it was pointed out that in North Carolina intestate prop-
erty was being disposed of by medievalistic laws long since outmoded;
and therein a new intestate succession statute, modeled along the lines
of modernized statutes in other states, was proposed. As a result of
this groundwork, the General Assembly of 1935 authorized the creation
of a commission to make a study of the existing laws relating to intestate
estates, wills, the administration of estates, and the duties and powers of
fiduciaries for the purpose of revising and modernizing such laws. The
commission was also charged with the duty of drafting appropriate
statutes for presentation to the legislature. A nine-man commission,
with Senator Carl L. Bailey as chairman, was appointed by Governor
Ehringhaus to undertake this task. Appointed by the Governor to
serve on the commission were the following persons: Professors R. B.
White of Wake Forest College, David F. Cavers of Duke University,
and Fred B. McCall of the University of North Carolina; and Messrs.
A. Wayland Cook of Greensboro, Jones Fuller of Durham, Silas G.
Bernard of Asheville, Joseph B. Cheshire, Jr., of Raleigh, and Lawrence
Watt of Winston-Salem. Later W. E. Church, Clerk of Superior Court
for Forsyth County, was added to the commission; and Professor Mal-
colm McDermott of Duke was appointed to take the place of Professor
Cavers who resigned following his appointment to a professorship in
the Harvard Law School. This commission made reports to the Gover-
nor in 1937 and in 1939 and drafted for introduction in the 1939 General
Assembly a bill consisting of 195 pages to re-write completely the law
of intestate succession, administration of estates, wills, and guardian-
ships. This voluminous bill was given serious consideration by the legis-
lature but, after having passed the Senate, failed of enactment by a
single vote in the House of Representatives. In its forward-looknig
proposals for changes in the North Carolina law, the commission's
report is said by legal scholars to have been twenty years ahead of its
time.
Although legislative activity in this connection remained dormant
for nearly twenty years, several former members of the commission,
including Forsyth County Clerk of Court William E. Church and
Professors Malcolm McDermott of Duke University and Fred B. McCall
of the University of North Carolina, persisted in their efforts to bring
about a revision of North Carolina's antiquated intestacy statutes. The
inadequacy and unfairness of these laws were dinned, perhaps ad nau-
seam, into the ears of law students, of members of civic clubs and
women's clubs, and of anyone else who would listen.
In 1957 the General Assembly appropriated some $2,500 to the
General Statutes Commission for the express purpose of making a study
of and recommending changes in the laws relating to intestate succes-
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sion. Early in that year this distinguished Commission, under the
Chairmanship of Mr. Robert F. Moseley of Greensboro, undertook the
revision of these statutes. The Commission appointed Professors Nor-
man A. Wiggins of the Wake Forest School of Law, W. Bryan Bolich
of the Duke University Law School, and Fred B. McCall of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina Law School to serve as a special committee
to draft a proposed new Intestate Succession Act for North Carolina-
This drafting committee entered upon its work in the latter part of the
year 1957.
In order to familiarize itself with modem legislative trends, this
committee studied carefully the laws of England and of many of the
American states which have revised and brought up to date, in the
light of changing social and economic conditions, their laws of intestate
succession. Especially helpful to it in the formulation of a new law was
the Model Probate Code, the 1939 study made by the Commission on
the Revision of the Laws of North Carolina Relating to Estates, and
one recently made on the subject by Professor Wiggins while doing
graduate work at Columbia University. Of course as much of the then
present North Carolina law as the committee deemed worthy of reten-
tion was retained as a framework upon which to hang the proposed new
law.
After nearly a year's work this committee in the fall of 1958 sub-
mitted a tentative draft of a statute to the General Statutes Commission
for its consideration. Thereafter, for a period of over three months the
committee met regularly with the Commission, which studied and ana-
lyzed word by word the proposed new law. A number of minor changes
in the committee's recommendations were made by the Commission;
but the major changes in the law urged by the committee, after presenta-
tion of arguments by its members in their behalf, were accepted by the
Commission. As a result of these combined efforts, extending over a
period of nearly two years, there evolved a proposed new Intestate Suc-
cession Act which was placed in bill form and introduced in the 1959
General Assembly in the Senate by Senator William Medford and in
the House by Representative Tim Valentine. After several weeks of
dedicated study by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and
their sub-committees, the statute proposed by the General Statutes
Commission-with some fairly minor changes made therein by the legis-
lature-was enacted into law, effective July 1, 1960.
A history of the new law would not be complete without mentioning
the very fine work done in connection with its drafting and enactment
by Mr. Thomas L. Young, then Revisor of Statutes, or the excellent
article written by feature writer Chester S. Davis of the Winston-Salem
Journal and Seitinel, entitled "Where There's a Will There's a Better
1960]
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Way," in which article, widely circulated while the legislature was in
session, Mr. Davis dramatically pointed out the inequities of estate dis-
tribution under the old law and discussed the major changes proposed
by the General Statutes Commission. Without doubt this article cre-
ated a climate of public opinion favorable to the enactment of the new
law.
We shall now consider the important changes made in the old law
and the philosophy and reasons upon which these changes were predi-
cated.
CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS AS TO INTESTATE SUCCESSION ABOLISHED
If we first look at new G.S. § 29-3 we find some sweeping changes
made in the law as it stood prior to July 1, 1960. Section 29-3 pro-
vides that
In the determination of those persons who take upon intestate
succession there is no distinction:
(1) Between real and personal property, or
(2) Between ancestral and non-ancestral property, or
(3) Between relations of the whole blood and those of the
half-blood.
In the determination of those persons who take upon intestate suc-
cession, this section abolishes the distinction between real and personal
property and facilitates the harmonization of the rules of succession into
one uniform system with but one class of heirs entitled to take both
kinds of property; and it further eliminates consideration of whether
the decedent's property was ancestral or non-ancestral or those taking
it were of the whole blood or half-blood insofar as intestate succession
.is concerned. As we shall see, 'all of these changes are reflective of
modern trends.
No Distinction Between Real and Personal Property
Specifically, the section first abolishes the separate statutes for the
descent of real property5 and for the distribution of personal property.0
Thus, in 1959 North Carolina finally joined "the movement towards
an elimination of the English difference between the descent of land
and the distribution of personalty [which] began very early in the
American Colonial period"--1639 in Connecticut; 1655 in Massachu-
setts.7 Curiously enough North Carolina had clung tenaciously to the
N.C. Gaz.2. STAT. § 29-1 (1950) [N.C. Laws 1784, ch. 204, § 2, as amended].0 N.C. Gw . STAT. § 28-149 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113, § 53, as
amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1893, ch. 82, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, ch.
166, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1915, ch. 37, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1921,
ch. 54, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1927, ch. 231, as amended, N.C. Sess. Laws
1945, ch. 46, as amended, N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 879].
6 PoWELL, REAL. PaoPER-Y 619 (1958).
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different systems though the historically based reasons for their dif-
ference have longssince ceased to exist. The plan of inheritance of
realty came through the feudal law of England and was designed to
support and defend the feudal economy; that of the distribution of per-
sonalty came from the Roman law and was administered by the Ecclesi-
astical Courts of England. Nevertheless until July 1, 1960, the land of
a person who died intestate before that date descended to one group of
heirs in certain proportions according to our Canons of Descent-
almost literally unchanged since 1808, while his personal property was
distributed to another group, consisting of his next of kin, in perhaps
different proportions according to the rules of our Statute of Distribu-
tions-a direct descendant of the 1670 English statute of the same name.
The illogicality of making the right of inheritance depend upon the
nature of the property owned by the decedent at the time of his death
has been removed by the new law. As Professor Powell well says :8
"There is no good reason for giving a spouse a life interest in the asset
if it be land, but an absolute outright interest if it be personalty." In
departing from the duality of the old English law North Carolina now
has one system which follows the American trend of distributing both
kinds of property to the same persons and in the same proportions, thus
generally following the historic rules for the distribution of personalty.
In the United States only Tennessee9 and Delaware- ° now retain sepa-
rate statutes of descent and distribution.
No Distinction Between Ancestral and Non-Ancestral Property
Secondly, for the purpose of determining those who shall take intes-
tate property no longer is there to be any distinction between ancestral
and non-ancestral propery. Up until the effective date of the new law
North Carolina was one of four states in this country which still re-
tained fully in force the ancestral property rule." England, from
whence the notion came that descent must be traced from the first pur-
chaser, abolished all distinction between ancestral and non-ancestral
property by the English Law of Property Act of 1925.12 The doctrine
originated in the common law rule of descent that only those collaterals
who were of the blood of the first purchaser of the land could inherit.
The common law of descent inquired into the source of the intestate's
8 6 PoWErL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 621. For an excellent discussion of intestate
succession in all its phases, including its historical and philosophical background,
see 6 POWELL, op. cit. supra, 606.
'TENN. ConE ANN. §§ 31-101, -201 (1955).1
°Dm. CoDE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 502, 512 (1953).11 AiRm. STAT. ANN. § 61-110 (1955) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 502 (1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (1950) [N.C. Laws 1784, ch. 204, § 2, as amended]; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-101 (1955).
1215 Geo. 5, c. 20. See Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23,
which was an adjunct of the Law of Property Act.
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title in order to return the land in the event of failure of lineal descend-
ants, to the relatives of the person who first brought it into the family.
This doctrine was formerly enunciated in G.S. § 29-1, Rule 4, which in
effect provided that on failure of lineal descendants, where the inherit-
ance has been transmitted by descent from the ancestor, or has been
derived by purchase (i.e., by will, gift, or settlement and hence the com-
plications of the Doctrine of Worthier Title) from the ancestor by one
who in the event of the ancestor's death would have been his heir or one
of his heirs, the collateral relatives who inherit the estate must be of the
blood of the first purchaser, through whatever intermediate devolution
by descent, gift, or devise it may have passed, and however remote it
may be from the first ancestor.'" There were two exceptions to the
North Carolina rule: (a) where property had not been so transmitted,
or if so, the blood of the ancestor was extindt, the collateral kin inherited
regardless of the ancestral property doctrine ;14 and (b) surviving par-
ents took from the decedent who died without leaving issue or brothers
or sisters or their issue, even though the parents were not of the blood
of the ancestor from whom the land descended.15 These laws, combining
out-dated principles with problems which engender litigation for their
construction, are eliminated by the new law. That "purchased property"
-whatever that means-should go to one set of heirs while "ancestral or
descended property"--whatever that means-should go to another set
can hardly be justified if it be admitted that the purpose of the law
should be simply to carry an intestate's property to those closest to him
in an effort to provide for those who probably would have been the
objects of his bounty had he expressed his wishes in the matter. The
effect of the new law is to cause all property to pass according to one
common rule whatever its character and from whatever source derived.
This is in keeping with the modern trend.
No Distinction Between Relations of the Whole Blood and Those of the
Half-Blood
Closely bound up with the ancestral property doctrine in North
Carolina was the question of inheritance by collateral kindred of the
half-blood. At common law heirs of the whole blood excluded those of
the half-blood principally because such exclusion would promote escheats
to the King. As early as 1784 the North Carolina legislature declared
that the half-bloods should inherit equally with the whole bloods in the
following language :1o "Whereas it is almost peculiar to the law of Great
Britain and founded in principles of the feudal system, which no longer
apply to that government and can never apply in this state, that the half-
's Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N.C. 650, 75 S.E. 930 (1912).
24N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-1(5) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739].
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (6) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739, as amended].1 N.C. Stat. 465 (Potter's Revisal, 1821).
[Vol. 39
NEW INTESTATE SUCCESSION ACT
blood should be excluded from inheritance, the lands of an intestate shall
descend to... as Well those of the half-blood as those of the whole blood,.
as tenants in common." This law was carried forward into G.S. § 29-1,
Rule 6. However, our court held17 that Rule 6 would have to be con-
strued with G.S. § 29-1, Rule 4, regarding the inheritance by collaterals
of ancestral estates, and that collateral relations of the half-blood in-
herited equally with those of the whole blood only when the former were
of the blood of the ancestor from whom the estate was derived.
Thus we see that although the distinction between whole and half-
bloods for inheritance purposes had long since been abolished by law, the
ancestral property doctrine, when applicable, seriously restricted the
right of inheritance by half-bloods. It follows that with the abolition
of the latter doctrine by the new law the half-bloods will inherit freely
with the whole bloods. North Carolina in this respect now follows the.
definite movement in America to assimilate the descent of realty to the
distribution of personalty which countenanced no such doctrine as that
of ancestral property, nor did it discriminate against half-blood collaterals.
in favor of the whole bloods. The new law should relieve the lawyer
from the embarrassment of trying to explain to his baffled client -the
operation of the old laws-which operation the lawyer himself probably
did not completely understand. How could you fully convince an heir
that although he was fully capable of sharing in the decedent's personalty,
yet he was not of the proper "blood" to inherit part of the realty?
ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY ABOLISHED
G.S. § 29-4 of the new law specifically abolishes the old marital life
estates of dower for the wife and curtesy for the husband and in lieu
thereof G.S. §§ 29-14 and -21 (the latter with reference to illegitimates)
give to the surviving spouse, whether husband or wife, an equal, sub-
stantial outright share in fee simple of the decedent spouse's estate-
Thus by statute the new law makes the surviving spouse an heir of the
decedent spouse and gives to such survivor, widow or widower, the same
intestate share of the decedent's estate. Such share is guaranteed by
new G.S. §§ 30-1 through 30-3 which give the survivor, who does not
receive one-half or more of the property passing upon the death of a
testator, a right to dissent from his or her will and generally to take his
or her intestate share as otherwise provided.
However, with the abolition of dower some protection would have
to be afforded a wife against the unilateral conveyance by the husband
and the consequent depletion by him of his estate, especially with refer-
ence to the place of residence, without the wife's joinder. By way of a
17 Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N.C. 650, 75 S.E. 930 (1912).
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compromise statute' the legislature provided by new G.S. § 29-30 that
the surviving spouse can elect to take a life estate in one-third in value
of the real property owned by the deceased spouse during coverture.
The usual dwelling house together with the land upon which it is situated
and reasonably necessary to its use and enjoyment may be elected even
though a life estate therein may exceed the one-third in value specified
above. Also included, if the election is made, is fee simple ownership
in the household furnishings. Thus if the husband under the new law
attempts to sell his realty without his wife's joinder in the deed his
vendee will take title thereto subject to his widow's right of election-
analogous to the situation, which arose under the old law,19 where the
husband's vendee took title to the land subject to the wife's dower right
therein. The law of Illinois"° makes similar provision for the spouse's
election to take this so-called "dower." The question might validly be
asked: Why should the surviving spouse choose a life estate in one-
third of the decedent's realty when he or she could take an outright fee
therein? The answer lies in the fact that the life estate is not subject to
the decedent's debts except those secured by purchase money mortgages
or deeds of trust,2 ' while the fee interest is "subject to the payment of
the costs of administration and other lawful claims against the estate. '22
Naturally, if the estate is insolvent the surviving spouse will choose the
valuable life estate. As Professor Rheinstein says :23 "Such a system of
combination affords the highest measure of protection to a surviving
spouse not only against disinheritance but also against financial ruin."
Thus we see that North Carolina in abolishing dower and curtesy
and, as of July 1, 1960, in giving the surviving spouse as heir an out-
right portion in fee has finally joined an American parade in this direc-
tion which began in the late 1700's. For instance, Vermont in 179724
abolished dower and curtesy and made outright provision for the sur-
viving spouse; our sister state of South Carolina 25 acted similarly in
1791. England and nearly two-thirds of the United States have gone
the full distance in making no distinction between the spouses as to the
intestate share each should take, whether the property be realty or per-
sonalty. The feudal reasons for allowing the first-born son to inherit
the father's realty and relegating the widow to a life estate in only one-
third thereof, or for depriving the husband of any estate at all in his
" This was adopted in lieu of a Homesite Statute proposed by the General
Statutes Commission which would have made void every conveyance of his realty
by the husband without his wife's joinder unless he showed to the clerk of court
that the intended conveyance did not include the principal place of residence.
"9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-6 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, § 35].
2" ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 18-39 (1957).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30(g) (Supp. 1959).
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-13 (Supp. 1959).
2 3RHEINSTEIN, CASES ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES 70 (2d ed. 1955).2 VERMONT LAWS DIGFSTED AND COMPILED TO 1807 131 (1808).25Brevard, DIGEST OF PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 422 (1814).
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wife's realty if no child was born alive of the marriage, simply no longer
should be allowed to influence the right of a surviving spouse to share
in the decedent spouse's estate as his rightful heir. And, we must not
forget the unfairness that existed under the old North Carolina law in
allowing the widower a life estate, as curtesy consummate, in all his
wife's lands, while the widow was allowed as her dower a life estate in
only one-third of her husband's lands, which, if there were no children or
their issue surviving, would descend to his brothers and sisters. Dower
and curtesy had to go-not only because in a modern society and econ-
omy they no longer adequately provided for the support of the surviving
spouse but also because they unnecessarily hampered freedom of aliena-
tion of land.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
Share of Surviving Spouse under New Law
In carefully worded language sections G.S. §§ 29-13 and -21 spell
out the shares which the surviving spouse whether husband or wife,
shall take in an intestate estate. If the surviving spouse is to be treated
as a statutory heir of the deceased spouse, what proportion of the estate
should go to the survivor? Should not a man's widow, who in all proba-
bility helped her husband create his estate, or the widower, who may
have contributed considerably to his wife's estate, be considered the
primary object of the decedent's bounty in the distribution of his estate
and receive, therefore, a substantial portion thereof? And should the
portion of the surviving parent be cut down in proportion to the number
of surviving children of their descendants so that he or she should share
equally with the children? It will be remembered that in the distribution
of personal property under the former law26 the surviving parent took
only a child's part thereof along with the children or their legal repre-
sentatives.
It will be noted that the new law 27 is in keeping with the almost uni-
versally accepted principle that the surviving spouse has a greater claim
on the estate which he or she helped to create than do lineal or collateral
kin. It is so drafted that in no case will the surviving spouse receive
less than one-third of the decedent's estate-no matter how many chil-
dren there may be. He or she will receive one-half if there be only one
child or the issue of only one deceased child; if the intestate is not sur-
vived by any child or the lineal descendants of any deceased child or by
a parent, the surviving spouse takes the entire net estate. This provision
for the spouse may seem to discriminate against the surviving children
26N.C. GEN. STAT. §28-149(1), (2), (8) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69,
ch. 113, § 53, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, ch. 166, § 1, as amended, N.C. Pub.
Laws 1921, ch. 54, § 1, as amended, N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 46, § 1].
27 N.C. Gm. STAT. § 29-14 (Supp. 1959).
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who are deemed to be the natural heirs of the decedent. However, if
such children are minors, the surviving spouse is charged with the duty
of supporting and educating them and should be given the means of
performing that duty. As has been indicated, under the old law if a
man died leaving a widow and nine children and the average estate of
.10,000 consisting mainly of personalty, his widow would take a child's
part thereof-one-tenth, or $1,000-and still would have to support nine
children. As Professor Wiggins has so well said :28 "It hardly seems
reasonable to cut down the means of adequately discharging the duty to
support in proportion to the increase in the duty ......
The inequity of this law was magnified in the case where the sur-
viving spouse, the children no longer being minors, was advanced in
age, and was faced with rising living costs and possible medical and
hospital care.
The General Statutes Commission in its report to the legislature
followed the drafting committee's recommendation that, e.g., "if the
intestate is survived by two or more children ... [the surviving spouse
should take] $5,000 in value or one-third of the net estate whichever is
greater." Such a provision, if it had been adopted would have given
the entire estate of the decedent to the surviving spouse if the net estate
did not exceed $5,000. Thus in the case of small estates the spouse
might take all for the support of herself and the children, and whatever
small shares, under the old law, the minor children would have taken
and would have been dissipated by guardianship costs would in effect
be preserved. The legislature, perhaps because of possible administra-
tive difficulties foreseen by it, struck out the monetary provision and
simply gave the surviving spouse one-third interest in the realty and
one-third of the personalty of the decedent spouse in the case put. How-
ever, the new law which gives to the surviving spouse a substantial out-
right share of the real and personal property of the decedent definitely
follows the modem trend of distribution both in this country and in
England.
Descendants, Ascendants and Collaterals
In setting up a hierarchy of inheritance the new law places the sur-
viving spouse first in line; then follow the children or their lineal de-
scendants; if there be no surviving spouse or children or lineal descend-
ants of a deceased child or children, the surviving parent or parents
take.29 If a surviving spouse, children or their descendants, or parents
fail to materialize as takers, then the property goes to the intestate's
brothers and sisters or their descendants; and if none of the latter, it
28 Special Report of the General Statutes Commission on an Act To Rewrite the
Intestate Succession Laws of North Carolina, at 18 (Feb. 16, 1959).
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-14, -15 (Supp. 1959).
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ascends to the grandparents of the decedent; then to his uncles and
aunts; then to his cousins. 30 It will be noticed that this sets up, roughly,
a parentelic scheme of inheritance for North Carolina.
Fixing the preferential rights of spouses and children gives little
trouble in establishing a scheme of inheritance. Some difficulty is en-
countered (1) when, absent surviving children or their descendants, we
have competing for shares in the decedent's estate his spouse and his
parent or parents; or (2) if there be no spouse or children, surviving
parents are competing with the decedent's brothers and sisters for pri-
ority of treatment. The new law3' answers the first problem by letting
the surviving spouse take one-half of the realty and $10,000 plus one-
half of the remainder of the personalty. This definitely favors the
spouse-especially if the.estate is small. As to the second, the new law3 2
allows the parents to take in preference to the brothers and sisters. This
changes the old law as to realty which preferred the collateral brothers
and sisters to the ascendant parents.33 In favor of the change it was
reasoned that the decedent's affection for his parents would be greater
than that which, because of the more distant relationship, he would have
for a brother or sister; and that the aged or aging parent would be in
greater need of help from the deceased child's estate than would the
latter's brothers and sisters who, being younger, would be more able to
fend for themselves. "During recent decades there has been a strong
trend to give the parents priority over brothers and sisters."34
SUCCESSION-LIMITATION ON SUccESSION BY COLLATERALS
While the new law places no limitation on the right of succession by
the lineal descendants of'an intestate, 35 it does provide 6 that
there shall be no right of succession by collateral kin who are more
than five degrees of kinship removed from an intestate; provided
that if there is no collateral relative within the five degrees of kin-
ship referred to herein, then collateral succession shall be un-
limited to prevent any property from escheating.
'The purpose of this latter section, as it was submitted to the legislature
.vithout the qualifying proviso, was to prevent an intestate's estate from
being cut up into infinitesimal parts among his more remote collateral
kindred whose consciousness of kinship with the decedent was .likely to
be correspondingly remote. Its aim was to cut off the right of inheritance
by a "laughing heir" or, as I have dubbed him, "a windfallee." It de-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-15 (Supp. 1959).
"N.C. GmE. STAT. § 29-14(3) (Supp. 1959).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §29-15(3), (4) (Supp. 1959).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(6) (1950) N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739, as amended].
" 6 PowEl, op. cit. supra note 7, at 633.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-6 (Supp. 1959).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-7 (Supp. 1959).
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parts from the old law 7 which permitted unlimited right of representa-
tion by collateral kin of an intestate. Under this section the cut-off
point for collateral kin of the decedent who inherit through his brothers
or sisters would be with the decedent's great-grandnieces and nephews;
and for his collaterals inheriting through his uncles and aunts, the termi-
nal point would be the decedent's cousins once-removed, or, as they
are sometimes denominated, his second cousins. That there should be
no taking by collaterals beyond the fifth degree cut-off point seems de-
sirable in view of the modern loosening 6f ties of kinship; that the prop-
erty should escheat to the state to be applied to growing social needs
rather than go to the grinning windfallee is reasonably arguable. How-
ever, under the proviso interpolated by the legislature, the blood-is-
thicker-than the State of North Carolina feeling prevailed and, if there
are collaterals beyond the fifth degree, they are allowed to take to pre-
vent an escheat of the decedent's property. In passing, it might be noted
that Kansas,88 in 1939, restricted collateral inheritance to persons within
the sixth degree of kinship.
DISTRIBUTION AMONG CLASSES
New G.S. § 29-16, which provides for the distribution of the intes-
tate's property among classes, represents a somewhat radical departure
from the old law and gives us perhaps the most novel feature of the
new Intestate Succession Act. Its purpose is to provide for a more
equitable distribution of a decedent's estate than has hitherto been af-
forded, among classes of his relatives, lineal or collateral, and among
the lineal descendants of deceased members of such classes. It mate-
rially changes the old North Carolina law"9 which provided that the
descent of realty should be on a strict per stirpes basis both to lineal
descehdants and collateral kindred (whether or not the claimants were
of equal or unequal degree of consanguinity with the decedent) and that
personalty should be distributed per capita with representation, i.e., if
those entitled to take were all equally related to the intestate then the
division should be per capita, but if it were necessary to bring the
claimants to equality as next of kin, the division should be per stirpes.40
The new law in effect provides that all property will be distributed per
capita to all persons in equal degree. To effectuate this end it spells
out a series of rules by which calculations of the shares of children,
grandchildren, brothers, nephews, etc., are to be determined. To illus-
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(3), (5) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739]; Johnston
v. Chesson, 59 1N.C. 46 (1860) (dictum).
"s KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-509 (1949), enacted by Kan. Laws 1939, ch. 180,§ 31. For further discussion of inheritance by collaterals and restrictions thereon,
see 6 PowEpI, op. cit. supra note 7, 637, 640.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(3) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739]; Clement v.
'Cauble, 55 N.C. 82 (1854).Ellis v. Harrison, 140 N.C. 444, 53 S.E. 299 (1906).
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trate its operation let us use a hypothetical example. Assume that P.
dies intestate owning an estate worth $90,000. Assume further that he
is survived only by a brother X; by nephews A, B, and C, children of
a deceased brother Y; and by nephew D, only child of a deceased brother,
Z. Under the old North Carolina law, surviving brother X will receive
$30,000 as his intestate share. Nephews A, B, and C will represent
their deceased father Y, and each will receive $10,000 as his share;
nephew D will represent his deceased father Z and receive $30,000 as
his intestate share. Under the new law brother X will still receive
$30,000 as his intestate share, but the remaining $60,000 will be dis-
tributed in equal shares of $15,000 each to nephews A, B, C, and
D. We think this is the distribution of his estate the intestate him-
self would have wanted. We could hardly attribute to him a desire
to discriminate among his nephews related to him in equal degree
and give to nephew D three times as much as nephew A got simply
because D happened to be an only child. While the operation of
new G.S. § 29-16 will be discussed later in greater detail by Professor
Wiggins, briefly stated our purpose in drafting it was to provide that
the surviving persons in the degree nearest the intestate should take
the same shares which they would have received under the old recog-
nized rule but to provide'that all the .property which would have gone
to deceased members in that degree should go as a unit to all persons
surviving them in the next degree and be divided per capita among such
persons. It is believed that the new law will, in departing from the
old strict per stirpes and per capita with representation doctrines, pro-
vide a more equitable basis for the distribution of an intestate's property.
ILLEGITIMATES
With regard to the inheritance rights of illegitimate children fhe niew
law seeks to remove further the stigma of the bar sinister by increasing
or improving on those rights. Under the law as it formerly stood 4 ' an
illegitimate child could not inherit through its mother from her relatives;
nor, if its mother left both legitimate and illegitimate children, could
the illegitimate inherit from her any property which came to her from
the father of the legitimate children. Under the new law, G.S. § 29-19,
the illegitimate is, for purposes of intestate succession, treated as if he
were the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his lineal descend-
ants may take by, through and from his mother and his other maternal
kindred, and they, in turn are allowed to inherit from him. Thus the
illegitimate for inheritance purposes is placed completely within the
family of the natural mother. Unless under new G.S. § 29-18 the child
"N.C. Gan. STAT. §§29-1(9), (10), 28-152 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1913,
ch. 71 § 1; N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 520, § 1; N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113,
§§ 57, 58].
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is legitimated by the father according to the applicable law of this or
any other jurisdiction, the illegitimate does not inherit from or through
his putative father, nor does the latter from him. The matrilineal pat-
tern of succession is further followed in new G.S. §§ 29-21 and -22
as to intestate succession from an illegitimate person by making the
mother and her family his intestate successors in the absence of a sur-
viving spouse or lineal descendants. Thus is recognized the fact that the
illegitimate most likely will have been nurtured and befriended by his
mother and her family rather than by his father or his family.
The drafting committee, in an attempt to enlarge the right of an
illegitimate to inherit from its putative father, tentatively proposed a
statute that would have permitted such inheritance if the paternity should
be established by a court of competent jurisdiction in determining the
putative father's responsibility for the non-support of his illegitimate
child. Objections, however, were made to this proposal on the ground
that such proceedings and hence findings of paternity would generally
be instituted and made in the lower and inferior courts of the state-
too shaky a foundation upon which to establish inheritance rights. The
proposal died "aborning." 42
ADOPTED CHILDREN
With reference to succession by, through, and from adopted chil-
dren, the new intestacy act, G.S. § 29-17, retains, with only one change,
all the excellent features of the old law.43  For inheritance purposes, a
child upon adoption is taken completely out of the blood stream of his
natural parents and put into the blood stream of his adoptive parents.
Complete transplantation takes place and all blood ties between the
adopted child and his natural parents are severed. However, under the
new law44 it is provided that if the natural parent of the child has pre-
viously married, is married to, or shall marry an adoptive parent, the
adopted child is still considered the natural child of such natural parent
for all purposes of intestate succession. It seemed logical tinder such
circumstances to put the adopted child back into the bloodstream of the
natural parent and thus restore, reciprocally, the rights of inheritance
inherent in such relationship.
4 Entirely aside from this, perhaps someday in freeing the illegitimate from the
sins of its parents we may become civilized enough to legislate, as did Arizona,
that: "Every child shall inherit from its natural parents, and from their kindred
heir [sic], lineal and collateral, in the same manner as children born in lawful
wedlock." ARiz. Iev. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956). Accord, ORE. LAWS 1957,
ch. 411, §§ 1, 3.
48N.C. GEN. STAT. §§28-149(10), (11), 29-1(14), (15) (1950) [N.C. Sess.
Laws 1947, ch. 879, § 1; N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 8321.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-17(e) (Supp. 1959).
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ADVANCEMENTS
The new law concerning advancements 45 makes some changes in the
old law. However, it does retain and codify some of the present case
law. It will be noticed that the new act broadens the doctrine of ad-
vancements to make it apply to inheritance-anticipating gifts by the
intestate donor to any person who would be his heir or one of his heirs
upon his death. 46 This definitely departs from the old law whereby
advancements were restricted to gifts from a parent to a child,47 which
law was derived from the English Statute of Distributions. 48 This
change in the law was predicated on the thought that while most ad-
vancements will be made to the child or grandchild of the donor, there
is no good reason why the more remote kin should not account for gifts
made to them if they too should be heirs of the intestate.
The doctrine of advancements complicates the distribution of an
intestate's property under the applicable intestacy law. The doctrine
itself is difficult to apply because what constitutes an advancement is
said to rest upon the intention of the advancor,49 and, under the former
law,0 rebuttable presumptions were resorted to in determining whether
or not an advancement was intended. G.S. § 29-24 of the new law alle-
viates this difficulty by providing that a gratuitous inter vivos transfer
is presumed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless shown
to be an advancement. This puts the burden of proof to that effect
squarely upon the person who claims that an advancement has been
made. As to a spouse who has become an heir of the decedent spouse
under the new law, new G.S. § 29-2(1) expressly provides that no gift
to a spouse shall be considered an advancement unless designated in
writing to be such. This definitely restricts, the doctrine as it might
apply to spouses. If the requirement of a writing should be applied to
all advancements for their validity, the difficulty of proof now encoun-
tered would be almost completely eliminated. However, the new law
does not go that last mile.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have tried to point out the major changes in the
law made by North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act-the his-
tory of the struggle to bring about those changes and the philosophy
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-2(1), -23 to -29 (Supp. 1959).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(1) (Supp. 1959).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§28-150, 29-1(2) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113,§54; N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739, as amended]; Parker v. Eason, 213 N.C. 115, 195
S.E. 360 (1938).
"' 1670, 22 & 23 Charles 2, c. 10, § 3.
"'Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922).
" Nobles v. Davenport, ,supra note 49; Kiger v. Terry, 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E.
38 (1896).
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upon which those changes are predicated. The new act is not beyond
the pale of criticism; some flaws in it will turn up which will have to
be cured by construction or by amendment. However, by virtue of its
enactment we believe that a better and fairer day has dawned for those
who take property by intestate succession in North Carolina and that
those persons who die intestate after July 1, 1960, can rest quite com-
fortably in their graves pacified by the assurance that the legislature has
made a pretty fair "will" for each of them in the disposition of their
property.
